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LECTURE
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN CANADA ♦
The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C.,
Chief Justice of Canada ∗

This lecture scans the development of human rights law in Canada from a
period of judicially implied rights, to the era of legislative protection, and
finally to the status quo of constitutional entrenchment. Progress to this final
stage has ensured that human rights are not threatened in Canada.
Nevertheless, significant challenges have arisen: The first involves a
challenge between advocates of civil liberties and advocates of antidiscrimination rights. The second growing challenge is the practice of
removing human rights from judicial review to specialized tribunals free
from judicial scrutiny in the interests of national security. The third
challenge lies in applying the concept of accommodation inherent in antidiscrimination rights in our increasingly diverse, multi-cultural societies.
Through our legal institutions and our institutions of citizenship and
community inclusion, these challenges can be acknowledged and brought
into the democratic dialogue, thereby ensuring that human rights can be
strengthened and sustained.
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I
INTRODUCTION
It is a great honour to be asked to deliver the 4th Annual Law
Society of Ireland Human Rights Lecture.
I came to law almost by accident, and to human rights late in
my career. Having completed my BA hon., I was uncertain what to
do. Someone said, “What about law?”. So, without really believing I
could be a lawyer, I wrote to the Dean of the University of Alberta
law School, asking for information. He wrote back: “You’re accepted”.
So when September came, I decided to give it a try.
Human rights came even later. Of course I knew what they
were, but it was not until I became a trial judge, and came to share
vicariously, day in and day out, the experiences of the men and
women who passed through my courtroom, that I began to appreciate
the fundamental importance of human rights. To be sure, I had not
reached that point in my life and career without encountering
stereotypical attitudes. But it was judging that brought the persistence
and perniciousness of inegalitarian and discriminatory thinking home
to me.
Discrimination, I came to see, was not confined to the overt
evils of racism and ethnic cleansing — although sadly the world still
knows these. Casual marginalization and inadvertent devaluation —
these too were forms of discrimination and for all their subtlety,
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capable of perpetuating prejudice, disadvantage and unfair denial of
opportunity.
Tonight, as you know, my topic is human rights. In the first
part of my talk, I will discuss briefly what we mean by human rights
and will talk about the history of protections for human rights in
Canada, from a few unwritten rights to a constitutionally entrenched
Charter which we have now had for 25 years. In the second part, I
will suggest that while we may feel justifiedly proud about our
achievements in securing human rights, they are not as secure as we
sometimes assume, and important challenges face us.
Human rights are rights founded on a simple but profound
idea — that every individual possesses equal worth and is equally
entitled to respect. This simple idea has given rise to two types of
human rights: one based on liberty, the other on the right to equal
treatment. Rights that are based on liberty focus on individual rights
and freedoms, such as freedom of expression, and rights to be free of
unreasonable seizure and detention, such as habeas corpus. These
rights we call civil liberties. Rights that focus on equal treatment, by
contrast, are aimed at ensuring individuals are not denied the benefit
of law or equality of treatment because of personal characteristics or
circumstances related to membership in a minority or disadvantaged
group, such as race, religion, gender or ethnic origin. These rights are
called anti-discrimination rights.
Human rights of both types have old, indeed ancient, roots.
They are grounded in the work of thinkers and scholars that have
preceded us, from the ancient Greeks onward. They have grown
strong and borne fruit through historic struggles like the struggle
against slavery. But human rights are also new. Only in recent
generations have nations enshrined the fundamental freedoms of their
citizens in constitutions. The US did this in 1791, Ireland in 1937,
Canada in 1982. And only in the last 60 years or so has the antidiscrimination right been recognized by the law, beginning with the
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.
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II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CANADA
Having identified the subject-matter generally, let me turn to
Canada’s experience with human rights. Canada’s experience can be
divided into three phases: 1) Judicially implied rights; 2) Legislatively
protected rights; and 3) Constitutionally protected human rights.
A. JUDICIALLY IMPLIED RIGHTS
Canada’s 1867 Constitution, while grounded in the rule of law
and democratic governance, did not provide for or protect human
rights, whether civil liberties or anti-discrimination rights. But in the
tradition of the Common Law, courts sometimes found these rights
implied, even striking out laws under the principle of freedom of
expression. Still, this left many denials of rights unrecognized and
unremedied, such as the detention of persons considered to be “enemy
aliens” during the Second World War, and the detention of thousands
of Quebecers on the basis of suspicion of sympathy with separatists
during the 1970's. Nor did this prevent grievous intrusions on the
liberties of Aboriginal peoples.
Before human rights legislation and the Charter, courts in
Canada relied on the theory of an “implied bill of rights” to protect
traditional civil liberties such as freedom of speech and association.
The theoretical foundation for these rights was the importance of free
political speech and discussion in a democracy. Because such
discussion is necessary to the functioning of democratic institutions,
the argument went, it must be implicitly guaranteed as essential to the
functioning of democratic institutions. 1 Thus, in 1938, in the Alberta
Press case, 2 the Supreme Court of Canada held that a provincial
legislature could not require newspapers to give the government a
right of reply to criticism of provincial policies. In a 1953 case called
Saumur v. Quebec, 3 a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses challenged
a Quebec municipal by-law that forbade the distribution of pamphlets
Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Thomson Canada Ltd. 2007) at
34-10 to 34-13; The Hon. Robert Sharpe and Kent Roach, The Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, 3rd ed., (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 9-11 .
2 Reference Re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100.
3 Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299.
1
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without the prior permission of the chief of police. The Supreme
Court of Canada struck down the by-law on the basis that it amounted
to a government power to censor political speech, which was
inconsistent with democratic government. And in 1957, in a case
called Switzman v. Elbling, 4 the Supreme Court held that a province
could not prohibit the use of a house to propagate communism.
These decisions constituted an important recognition of civil
liberties. But the protection of the implied bill of rights was limited,
and uncertain.
It was limited in the rights it protected. It was applied in only
a few cases. Indeed, the three cases I have mentioned are the only
cases in which the Supreme Court relied on the theory of the implied
bill of rights to strike down government action which restricted
freedom of speech or religion.
The implied bill of rights was also limited in that it only
protected classic liberal rights such as the right to freedom of speech
and freedom of assembly. These rights are, of course, fundamentally
important, but they do not capture the full panoply of what we think
of when we talk about human rights today.
The protection offered by the implied bill of rights approach
was also uncertain. As it was not codified either in legislation or in
the Constitution, its scope was unclear, and judges resorted to it in
only a handful of cases. Presumably these were cases where judges
viewed the government’s actions as particularly egregious. Thus,
while the implied bill of rights did protect rights in some important
cases, it did not provide for consistent protection of human rights.
B. LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The modern human rights movement in Canada, and around
the world, sprang from the ashes of the Second World War. In
response to the atrocities of the Holocaust and the totalitarian regimes
of the Axis powers, early proponents of human rights advocated
creating domestic and international laws to recognize and protect the
inherent dignity of the human person.
Internationally, the United Nations adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. A Canadian law professor and
4
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diplomat, John Humphrey, wrote the first draft of the Universal
Declaration, and jurists and diplomats from many countries were
instrumental in its adoption. 5 This was followed in 1966 with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 6
The basic principle underlying the human rights movement is
briefly yet eloquently stated in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.

Canada was an early leader in the human rights movement.
At home, Canada’s first Bill of Rights was enacted in Saskatchewan in
1947. 7 Other provinces followed suit with Bills of Rights and Human
Rights Codes from the 1950's through the 1970's. 8
Although there is some overlap between Bills of Rights and
Human Rights Codes, generally Bills of Rights protect individuals
from governments breaching their rights, while Human Rights Codes
generally deal with private action.
This second stage of human rights development in Canada can
be characterized as a period of growth. As more and more provinces
passed Human Rights Codes, the types of rights protected expanded,
as did people’s consciousness of their rights. Early provincial Bills of
Rights protected traditional notions of rights, such as freedom of
speech, press, assembly, religion and association. As human rights law
developed, codes expanded to cover the right to be free from
discrimination in areas such as employment and housing.
Statutory Human Rights Codes have had lasting success in
protecting against discrimination in the private sector. However,
statutory Bills of Rights did not have the same success when it came to
protecting individual rights against infringement by government. As
important as legislation protecting civil liberties and human rights is,
William Schabas, “Canada and the Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights” (1998) 43 McGill L.J. 403; Michael Ignatieff, The Rights Revolution (Toronto:
House of Anansi Press, 2000) at 10.
6 Sharpe and Roach, supra note 1 at 14-15.
7 S.S. 1947, c. 35. Repealed and replaced by the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code,
S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1.
8 Hogg, supra note 1 at 34-7 and 34-8
5
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it has a major limitation. Courts have described human rights
legislation as quasi-constitutional. Yet for all that, it is still legislation.
If government chooses to pass other legislation which takes away
from human rights protection, it is free to do so. This problem can be
seen most clearly in the ultimate failure of the Canadian Bill of
Rights. 9
Often referred to as the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights, the
Canadian Bill of Rights was passed in 1960. Its reach, on paper, was
large. It protected fundamental freedoms such as freedom of religion,
speech, assembly and association as well as legal rights, including
protections against arbitrary detention and imprisonment, and the
right to counsel. It also guaranteed equality “before the law.” Yet it
was also limited. The Canadian Bill of Rights only applied to the
federal government, not to the provinces. Further, it was contained
in ordinary legislation, not constitutionally entrenched. This led the
courts to interpret it narrowly. Where the right claimed by a person
conflicted with existing law, the Canadian Bill of Rights was generally
read as not creating new rights. In the 22 years between the
enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights, and the adoption of the
Charter, in only one case did the Supreme Court strike down a law for
breach of the Bill of Rights. 10
In the result, the Canadian Bill of Rights is now widely seen as
a failure.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
This leads me to the third stage of human rights protection in
Canada, the constitutional entrenchment of human rights. In the
wake of the failure of the Canadian Bill of Rights, many believed that
human rights protection would be truly effective only if it was
entrenched in the Constitution. Thus when, following years of onagain off-again constitutional negotiations, the Constitution of Canada
was repatriated in 1982, the country included the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution Act, 1982.

9

S.C. 1960, c. 44.
Hogg, supra at 35-10; R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282.
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The Charter protects many of the same rights that were in the
Canadian Bill of Rights, such as freedom of religion, speech,
association and assembly, and legal rights, as well as a number of new
rights — a broadened equality guarantee, guarantees of language
rights, minority language education rights, and Aboriginal rights. But
the biggest change is that the Charter, unlike previous Bills of Rights
in Canada, is part of the Constitution. The Constitution is the
supreme law of Canada. It cannot be repealed — at least not without
great difficulty — and all other laws must comply with it. And
unlike the Canadian Bill of Rights, the Charter applies to both the
federal government and the provinces.
Supported by the Constitutional entrenchment of the Charter,
the courts gave a broad and purposive interpretation to the rights it
guaranteed. If existing laws did not comply with the rights in the
Charter, then those laws had to change. If government action did not
comply with the Charter, then government had to change the way it
acted.
The project of protecting individual rights in a democracy
does not mean the interests of society as a whole are ignored. The
Charter contains an express provision that allows the government to
pass laws which limit constitutional rights if the government can
justify the reasons for the limit. In this regard, the structure of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is similar to many modern
constitutions, including the European Convention on Human
Rights. 11
Section 1 of the Charter provides that the rights contained in
the Charter are subject to “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” This
does not mean that the government can run roughshod over
individual rights. Rather, it requires that the government justify
limits on rights. Limits must be prescribed by law. This ensures that
the limits on rights are knowable and fixed. There must be an
important societal objective which justifies limiting rights. There
must be a rational connection between the limit on rights and the

Lorraine Weinrib, “Canada’s Charter: Comparative Influences, International
Stature”, in The Charter at Twenty, Debra McAllister and Adam Dodek eds., Ontario
Bar Association (2002) at 495-98; William Schabas and Stéphane Beaulac,
International Human Rights and Canadian Law, Thomson Carswell (2007) at 255-59.
11

10

legislative objective.
And most importantly, there must be
proportionality between the government objective and the limit on
rights – rights must be limited no more than necessary to achieve the
government objective. Through this exercise of justification, the
Charter permits a balancing of individual rights and societal needs.
Another reason I believe the Charter provides effective rights
protection in Canada is that it has been interpreted to give each
branch of government a role in rights protection. Human rights
protection and the Charter are not the work of the courts alone. The
courts rule on whether the Charter has been complied with or
breached in specific cases, either by unconstitutional legislation, or by
government actions. But the government and the legislatures must
also consider the Charter. In passing legislation and carrying out
government actions, both the executive and the legislature must give
consideration to whether their actions comply with the Charter. And
if in a particular case the courts strike down a law because it does not
comply with the Charter, the government and the legislature must
consider whether to enact new legislation in response, and if so, how
to ensure that the new legislation complies with the Charter.
So, that is where we have been. Where are we going? What
are the current challenges and future directions of human rights law
in Canada? The most serious challenge I see is not just a Canadian
challenge, but a challenge for every modern state determined to
protect human rights — the challenge of incorporating ideas of
multiculturalism, difference, and tolerance into human rights
protection. A secondary challenge flowing from this challenge is
institutional. It is the task of the courts and of legal tribunals to define
the difficult accommodations that maintaining human rights in a
multi-cultural context impose. This plants them firmly at the center
of controversial political debates about how far a particular society
should go in accommodating difference. It is to these two challenges
that I now turn.
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III
CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE
Human rights are not threatened in Canada. But neither are
they fully secure. They cannot be taken for granted. Recent decades
reveal three growing challenges. The first challenge is the tension
between advocates of civil liberties and advocates of antidiscrimination rights. The second growing challenge is the practice of
removing human rights from judicial review to specialized tribunals
free from judicial scrutiny, in the interests of national security. The
third challenge lies in applying the concept of accommodation
inherent in anti-discrimination rights in our increasingly diverse,
multi-cultural societies.

A. THE CHALLENGE OF THE TENSION BETWEEN PROTECTION OF
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PROTECTION AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION
We sometimes hear people talk of civil liberties versus antidiscrimination equality rights — “individual rights” versus “group
rights” — as though they are incompatible. The suggestion is that one
is more important than the other, and that the practice of human
rights must choose between them. This is a false dichotomy. It is not a
question of “either/or”. A full, inclusive vision of human rights must
recognize both civil liberties and equality rights.
This said, tensions between the two types of human rights —
individual-based civil liberties on the one hand and group-based
equality rights on the other — are real, and must be resolved. Antidiscrimination rights can be taken to imply that criticism or
denigration, direct or indirect, of minority groups is off-bounds. This
may conflict with the basic civil liberties, notably freedom of
expression. In Keegstra, 12 the Supreme Court of Canada upheld antihate laws as constitutional and justified. In Zundel, 13 by contrast, the
Supreme Court of Canada struck down “false-news” laws as violative
of free speech. Generally, the Court has drawn the line so as to permit

12
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R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731.
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a robust level of criticism. Freedom of expression is highly valued;
intrusions must be strictly justified.
None of us would or should condone the slander of a
particular religion or ethnic group. Nor should we be blind to the
harm this can cause, both to the affected group and to social harmony.
But by the same token, the right to debate and discuss ideas, upon
which democracy and our ability to live together rests, must be
preserved. When freedom of expression conflicts with other rights or
interests, it falls to those seeking to limit the right to free expression
to justify the limit. Courts and tribunals may be called on to
determine whether the proposed limit is justified. In this way, the
dispute is resolved.
However, tensions continue. Recently, several Canadian
Human Rights Commissions have taken speech that is alleged to
denigrate a particular group to task. In a Canadian take on the Danish
cartoons issue that recently dominated the European press, a publisher
published cartoons that were said to blaspheme the Prophet, and was
brought up before the Alberta Human Rights Commission. 14 Members
of the Muslim community filed a human rights complaint alleging
that the cartoons constituted promotion of racial or ethnic hatred.
The proceedings were ultimately dropped, but generated considerable
debate on where the line should be drawn between free speech and
maintaining a respectful attitude toward minority beliefs.
These and similar cases show that not everyone agrees on
where the line is to be drawn. But thus far, I believe we can say that
in Canada it has been drawn in a fair and principled way. Justice has
been preserved. The need to respect difference has been
acknowledged. Peaceful co-existence has been affirmed.

B. THE CHALLENGE OF MAINTAINING NATIONAL SECURITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS

We live in an era of terrorism. Concerns for national security
dominate the news. You in Ireland know all too well the destructive
“Western Canadian magazine publishes Muhammad cartoons”, CBC News,
February 13, 2006, online:
<http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2006/02/13/cartoons060213.html>;
“Muslim leader drops Ezra Levant cartoon complaint”, National Post, February 12,
2008, online: <http://www.nationalpost.com/news/canada/story.html?id=303895>.

14

13

impact of dedicated and ruthless terrorists and the threat they pose to
peaceful democratic governance. Terrorism, we all agree, must be
fought.
However, this poses a challenge for human rights. Human
rights may be attenuated and indeed denied as a result of security
fears and concerns. This may be done by executive action or
legislation. The power of elected officials to enact laws limiting rights
to the extent as may be reasonable and necessary to combat terrorism
cannot be denied. However, in a democracy, these actions must
conform to the constitution and be subject to judicial review.
My point is simple: to preserve human rights while fighting
terrorism, we cannot deny the courts, the traditional protectors of
human rights, the right to independently review executive and
legislative decisions affecting the rights of persons suspected of being
threats to security, or we risk casting these persons into legal black
holes. We must not place our policies and places of detention outside
the domain of the courts and beyond judicial review.
The Supreme Court of Canada has taken the position that this
cannot happen. In dealing with security certificate laws, in the
Charkaoui case, 15 the Court insisted that the state justify deprivations
of liberty of immigrants alleged to be terrorists. To admit that there
are zones where individuals are not protected stands in direct
contradiction to the fundamental principle of human rights that all
human beings are of equal worth and should be treated accordingly.
Judicial review is the condition precedent of human rights. The
matter, to be sure, is not simple. There may be documents or secrets
that cannot be fully disclosed to the parties for security reasons, for
example. But the bottom line is that when the state seeks to deprive a
person of his or her liberty, there must be meaningful judicial review.
In the recent Khadr case, 16 the Court re-asserted the overriding
importance of judicial review in the protection of human rights. The
case concerned Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen detained by U.S.
forces at Guantanamo Bay since 2002, and now being prosecuted by
the U.S. on terrorism-related charges. Canadian intelligence agents
interviewed Mr. Khadr in Guantanamo, and subsequently handed
over the products of these interviews to U.S. authorities. The Court
15
16

Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350.
Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, 2008 SCC 28.
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held that Mr. Khadr was entitled to disclosure of the interview
documents passed on to the U.S. authorities, because Canada had
participated in a process that was contrary to its international human
rights obligations. Under these circumstances, the Charter, and the
courts’ ability to hold government action to human rights standards,
could exceptionally apply outside of Canada.

C. THE CHALLENGE OF ACCOMMODATION
Canada is by history a nation of diverse cultures and
ethnicities. But even countries that do not have histories of colonial
conquest and generational immigration, such as Ireland, face the
challenge of diversity. World populations are, quite literally, on the
move. Increasingly, we are all confronted by the other in our midst,
forced, whether we like it or not, to find accommodations between
our traditional ways and new ways that may seem strange, even
wrong.
Against this background, let me return to the Canadian
situation. Many of the human rights protected by Canada’s Human
Rights Codes and the Charter focus on diversity. Section 2(a) protects
freedom of religion. Section 15 of the Charter makes it clear that all
individuals in Canada, regardless of race, religion, national or ethnic
origin, colour, sex, age or physical or mental disability, are to be
considered equal. Section 27 provides that the Charter is to be
“interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and
enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians”. Other
sections protect minority language and education rights, and
Aboriginal rights. 17 It follows that the increasing diversification of
Canadian society will affect the interpretation of rights.
It is inevitable that rights as diverse as these may lead to onthe-ground conflicts. Sometimes the conflict is between different
rights. Freedom of religion may conflict with gender equality, for
example, or it may run up against freedom of speech. Sometimes the
conflict may not be between rights, but between a particular right and
a societal interest, such as security or freedom of contract. When
conflicts such as these come before the courts, judges are called upon
17

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 16-23, 25, 35.
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to reconcile and balance the competing claims, a process we refer to as
reasonable accommodation.
A recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada presents a
graphic example of the complexity of the competing demands that can
result from a commitment to protecting human rights in a multicultural society. In a 2006 decision, known as the Multani case, the
Court considered the issue of whether a Sikh student, whose religion
required him to wear a kirpan, should be permitted to wear it while
he attended public school. 18 A kirpan is a religious object that
resembles a dagger, and must be made of metal. The case, brought
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and under the
Quebec provincial Charter, required the Court to weigh freedom of
religion against student safety in public schools.
Mr. Multani and his family claimed that the Charter guarantee
of freedom of religion protected his right to wear the kirpan. The
school board, on the other hand, argued that he should not be
permitted to carry a kirpan because it contravened a code of conduct
which prohibited students from carrying weapons and dangerous
objects. What tipped the scale for the Court was that the evidence did
not support the conclusion that the kirpan, which was sewn inside a
small pocket inside the boy’s clothing, posed a real risk to the security
in the school. In fact, it posed no more risk than many objects that
are readily available in schools, such as scissors, compasses, baseball
bats and table knives in the school cafeteria. It followed that the
school board had not established that the restriction on Mr. Multani’s
religious duty was reasonably necessary, and the board was
consequently required to accommodate his religious practice by
letting him carry the kirpan. The Court interpreted freedom of
religion broadly, as protecting beliefs or practices that an individual
sincerely believes are required by his or her religion. Yet it also stated
that freedom of religion is subject to reasonable limits, which it is for
the government to justify. To allow the student to carry a bare kirpan
might well have been unreasonable. But by accommodating the way
he exercised his religious right in order to meet security concerns, Mr.
Multani satisfied those security concerns put against him. In the end,
both freedom of religion and security were protected.

18
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court underlined the
importance of respect and tolerance for different beliefs in a
democratic society:
An absolute prohibition [on wearing the kirpan] would
stifle the promotion of values such as multiculturalism,
diversity, and the development of an educational culture
respectful of the rights of others. 19

Another example of the tensions between rights protection
and diversity is provided by a case heard last year, which required the
Court to decide whether a term of a negotiated civil divorce
settlement requiring the husband to give his wife a Jewish religious
divorce (a get) was enforceable in the civil courts such that the
husband could be required to pay damages for not complying with the
settlement. 20
The husband claimed that requiring him to pay damages for
not giving the get violated his right to freedom of religion. The wife
claimed that the settlement was freely entered into, and the husband
should pay damages for not complying with it. She claimed that his
breach of the settlement caused her harm and violated her right to
equality, because unless he gave her a religious divorce, she could not
remarry in her faith. Thus, the case raised competing claims of
religious freedom, gender equality, the relationship between religion
and the state, and how these things impact on a contract freely
entered into.
The majority of the Court decided that the term in the
settlement requiring the husband to give the get was valid and
enforceable. As a result the husband was required to pay the wife
damages for breaching it. If the husband’s right to religious freedom
was violated – which was not clear, because the evidence suggested he
may have refused to give the get out of anger at his wife, rather than
for religious reasons – the violation was justified by the competing
values of equality, and the modern Canadian approach to the right to
marry and divorce, which allows individuals to decide for themselves
when their marriage is irretrievably broken, and lets them move on
with their lives – rights given equally to women and men.
19
20

Multani, supra at 297.
Bruker v. Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54.
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The issues raised by the case highlight some of the
complexities and challenges of rights protection in a multicultural
society. As the majority noted:
Determining when the assertion of a right based on
difference must yield to a more pressing public interest is a
complex, nuanced, fact-specific exercise that defies brightline application. It is, at the same time, a delicate necessity
for protecting the evolutionary integrity of both
multiculturalism and public confidence in its importance. 21

I have mentioned two Canadian cases that illustrate the
difficult and delicate questions that emerge when human rights are
applied in a diverse, multi-cultural society. Similar cases have made
headlines in Europe and others parts of the world. We are all familiar
with the debate about headscarves in France, or the condemnation of
the Danish publisher who published cartoons many believed
defamatory of the Prophet (the same cartoons that figured in the
Western Standard case in Canada which I mentioned earlier). As our
countries become ever more diverse, such clashes can only be
expected to increase.
In the Canadian province of Quebec, which places great store
in its distinctive culture, the debate over cases such as those I have
discussed rose to the point where the Province appointed a royal
commission to inquire into the subject of reasonable accommodation
of religious and cultural minorities. The commission provoked a
heated public dialogue about the accommodation of differences, 22 not
always easy issues to discuss, as they deal with sensitive issues of
individual and group identity. The commissioners crossed and crisscrossed the Province, hearing the views of citizens and interested
groups. Some of the comments they heard were harsh, bordering on
the xenophobic. But many were supportive of the vision of a tolerant
society, in which people of different faiths and creeds can live and
work together through the ethic of human rights and reasonable
Bruker v. Marcovitz, supra at para. 2, per Abella J.
Order in Council Concerning the Establishment of the Consultation Commission on
Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences, O.C. 95-2007.

21
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accommodation. The commission’s final report concluded that
“integration through pluralism, equality and reciprocity is by far the
most commendable, reasonable course”.
The commission
recommended adopting the values of interculturalism and open
secularism as a way to develop a shared identity based on a citizen
culture. 23 These are complex and difficult concepts, which makes it is
all the more necessary for all citizens to be involved in the public
dialogue.
One thing seems certain; protecting human rights in a diverse
multicultural society is an endeavour in which all our institutions
must engage, chief among them our legal institutions.
Far from destroying our collective national and community
identities, human rights both pre-suppose those identities and sustain
them. While we like to say each person is born with rights, in
historical terms rights are a social construct, a product of history, of
ideas, of struggles and of institutions. Moreover, in functional terms,
human rights presuppose and can only be effective in a community or
nation where there is general acceptance by all that “we are all in this
together”. 24 To work properly, the idea of human rights presupposes a
degree of cultural solidarity. As citizens, we have special obligations
to each other. One of those obligations is to respect the differences of
our co-citizens and to accommodate their religious and cultural rights
insofar as this can reasonably be done. Citizens compromise because
they recognize that this is a responsibility that society imposes on
them as the correlative of their enjoyment of their own rights. The
rights asserted by some citizens must connect with the obligation felt
by others, if human rights are to be sustained. This pre-supposes a
sense of communal identity, and in the end strengthens it.
Thus human rights should not be seen as undermining our
common identities and national commitments. On the contrary, for
human rights to work we need nation-states and a sense of adherence
to nation-states. And we need to find ways to encourage the
minorities within those states to identify with the larger whole. Until

G. Bouchard, C. Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation, <online:
http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/rapports/rapport-final-abregeen.pdf>, at pp. 93-4.
24 Goodhart, “Has Multiculturalism Had Its Day?” Literary Review of Canada, Vol. 16,
April 2008 3 at p. 4
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recent times, the basis of this shared identity “would have been
mainly ethnicity – shared ancestry, history, sacrifice and myths. In
multi-ethnic and multi-racial societies the basis of specialness is the
thinner fabric of citizenship itself.” 25
Canada, which accepts more immigrants per capita than any
other nation of the world, recognizes this. 26 Every immigrant has the
right to become a citizen of Canada after five years — a full citizen,
in every sense of the word, invited to share our future but equally
importantly, our past, warts and all. The message is simple: you are
now part of us, and we are all in this together. We share rights, but
also responsibilities. We recognize that everyone has rights, but we
also accept that when clashes between rights or conflicting interests
like security arise, the individual exercise of those rights may, by the
very nature of rights and the social contract, be constrained.
We need human rights. Whether we like it or not, religious,
ethnic and cultural diversity is part of our modern world — and
increasingly, part of our national and community reality. Human
rights and the respect for every individual upon which they rest, offer
the best hope for reconciling the conflicts this diversity is bound to
generate. If we are to live together in peace and harmony — within
our nations and as nations in the wider world — we must find ways to
accommodate each other. Human rights, expressed in the fabric of
our law and administered by our courts and tribunals, provide a way
to accomplish this.
How do we strengthen human rights and counter the critics
who argue against the compromises and accommodations the practice
of human rights demands? I would suggest that we do so as we have
met social challenges in the past – through our institutions.
The first line of defence is our legal institutions. It is through
the law and the courts that the day-to-day accommodations that
guarantee human rights in a diverse society are worked out, and our
differences thus reconciled. This task places the law and her officers
at the heart of some of the most sensitive debates of our time.
Inevitably, it requires lawyers to take unpopular stands, judges to
make unpopular decisions. Our challenge is to find the courage to
discharge this task with integrity.
25
26

Goodhart, supra note 24.
Globe and Mail, May 2, 2008.
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The second is through our institutions of citizenship and
community inclusion. The minorities among us must be brought into
the larger political community, made to feel part of the larger
enterprise. Acceptance of the compromises that human rights imply
can only work in the long run if there is general agreement that we
are “all in this together”. “Rights are not a free lunch — in a
democracy, an asserted right can be sustained only if a critical mass of
the population accepts the corresponding obligations”. 27
Courageous lawyers and judges; wise and inclusive
statesmanship — these are ultimate guarantors of our human rights,
and ultimately, dare I suggest, of peaceful co-existence in our evershrinking world.
IV
CONCLUSION
Canada, like Ireland, has a long and unique history of the
protection of human rights. Over the last 75 years, human rights have
emerged as a central component of our societal and legal systems.
Together with democratic governance, a free economy and the rule of
law, human rights have come to define who we are as peoples, and
what we stand for.

Despite this achievement — an achievement that I believe
represents an advance of huge importance in terms of human social
evolution — the battles for individual liberties and equal respect
for the worth of each individual are far from finished. Different
societies face different challenges. Tonight, I have discussed some
of the challenges we face in Canada. You, in Ireland, face your
own challenges. By acknowledging those challenges and making
them part of the democratic dialogue, as we are doing tonight, we
sustain and strengthen human rights and enhance the world we
share.

27
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